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The Exception that Ate the Rule: Why QRM Should
Not Equal QM
I. INTRODUCTION

Representative Barney Frank stated that the credit risk retention
rule of his namesake legislation, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (the "Dodd-Frank Act"), was the "single
most important part of th[e] bill."' The credit risk retention rule
requires securitizers of asset-backed securities (ABS) to hold 5% of the
credit risk on any asset they securitize as "skin in the game." 2 Congress
believed that having skin in the game would align the interests of
securitizers with investors and promote a safer secondary market, thus
preventing a repeat of the 2008 financial crisis. 3 The Dodd-Frank Act
provided securitizers of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS)
an exemption from the credit risk retention requirement if a mortgage
met the standards of a "qualified residential mortgage" (QRM).4
Congress intended QRMs to mirror mortgages made with certain traits
that might have accounted for their historical record of good
performance. 5
In an effort to curb predatory mortgage lending, Congress
delineated general mortgage standards within the Dodd-Frank Act
which required the lender to establish that the borrower had the ability
to repay the loan.6 Under these new standards the lender would extend
credit based on the borrower's ability to repay the loan rather than on

1. Shirley Gao, Dodd-Frankauthoris proudest of "skin in the game" requirementfor
mortgage securitizers, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Nov. 28, 2011, 11:04 AM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/07/11/5194/dodd-frank-author-proudest-skin-gamerequirement-mortgage-securitizers.
2. See Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o1 1(c)(1)(B) (2012).
3. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(e)(4).
5. See generally 156 CONG. REc. S3575 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Mary Landrieu) (discussing how QRM should be defined).
6. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2012).
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The
the pre-closure value of the home securing the loan.7
of
a
broad
availability
rule
was
created
to
maintain
ability-to-repay
credit to consumers while ensuring that lenders were selling safe
products. 8 The ability-to-repay rule exposed mortgage originators to
substantial liability if the originator did not make a reasonable and
good-faith determination based on verified and documented information
that the consumer had a reasonable ability to repay the loan at the time
the loan was consummated. 9 The rule provides a safe harbor and
rebuttable presumption of compliance.' 0 The lender need not establish
the borrower's ability to repay if the loan is a "qualified
mortgage" (QM). 1 The QM standard was intended to be a general
mortgage underwriting standard that captured a majority of the
traditional mortgage market to prevent restriction of credit
availability. 12
Congress instructed the newly created Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) to define QM and instructed six federal
agencies, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and the Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (collectively "the Agencies"), to
jointly define QRM. 13 In April 2011, the Agencies proposed a
definition of QRM that received considerable negative feedback.14 The
CFPB did not release its final definition of QM until January 2013. '
Due to the negative feedback on the proposed QRM definition, the
Agencies re-proposed the QRM definition in August 2013 aligning the
7. Id.
8. See generally Raymond Natter, Congressional Intent Regarding the Qualified
Mortgage Provision,SELECTEDWORKS available at
http://works.bepress.com/raymond-natter/2/(discussing Congress's intent in creating the
ability-to-repay rule).
9. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1).
10. Id. § 1639c(b).
11. Id.
12. See Natter, supra note 8, at 9-12.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(B); 15 U.S.C. 78o-11(b)(2).
14. See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,120 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43); Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,988
(proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
15. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026).
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meaning of QRM with the CFPB's definition of QM.16 However,
because the Agencies (which ironically does not include the CFPB)
continue to disagree on which definition to adopt for QRM, they also
included an alternative to the QRM-QM definition called QM-Plus.17
This Note discusses why Congress did not intend for QRM to
mean QM as defined by the CFPB and, therefore, why the re-proposed
rule should not be adopted. Part II provides a brief background of the
financial crisis.1 Part III discusses the ability-to-repay and credit risk
retention rules under the Dodd-Frank Act. 19 Part IV then examines the
CFPB's and the Agencies' rulemaking that define QM and QRM.2 0
Finally, in Part V, this Note concludes that QRM should not have the
same meaning as QM because Congress intended to protect two distinct
groups, each needing a separate definition tailored to its specific goals.2 '
II.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
In 2008, the United States entered into the worst financial crisis
it has seen since the Great Depression.2 2 Rising home prices and
significant decreases in interest rates created a housing bubble in the
early 2000s. 23 Nontraditional mortgage products were created in part to
help borrowers afford to buy a home in this housing market.24 In some
cases, these mortgages were deceptive.25 When low teaser rates expired
and reset at higher rates, borrowers were often able to avoid the
increased payments by refinancing to a new nontraditional mortgage
16. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,989.
17. Id. at 57,993.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. See Thomas F. Siems, Brandingthe Great Recession, FIN. INSIGHTS (FED. RESERVE
BANK OF DALL.) May 13, 2012, at 3, available at
http://www.dallasfed.org/assets/documents/banking/firm/fi/fil201.pdf (discussing why the
2008 financial crisis is the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression).
23. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6410 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1026).
24. See Bill Thomas, Keith Hennessey & Douglas Holtz-Eakin, What Caused the
FinancialCrisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704698004576104500524998280.html
(giving one opinion on what caused the financial crisis).
25.

Id.
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with a new low teaser interest rate.26 Lenders exacerbated the problem
by permitting borrowers to sign up for so-called "low documentation"
or "no documentation" loans, which often "featured loan applications
characterized by misstated or falsified income." 27 When the housing
bubble burst and home prices dropped, borrowers facing interest rate
resets lost the ability to refinance their mortgages or were unwilling to
make payments because the value of their homes declined below the
amount they owed on their mortgages.2 8 This led to many borrowers
defaulting on their nontraditional mortgage loans. 29
Failures in credit rating and securitization transformed these
mortgages into toxic financial assets, of which large and midsize
financial institutions amassed enormous concentrations. 30 Financial
institutions failed to grasp the risk they were taking on because they
neglected to look behind the ratings and do their own due diligence.3 1
By the early 2000s, many private financial institutions were using
securities and derivative products to create complex mortgage-related
investment vehicles.32 The risk associated with these products was
amplified by financial institutions holding too little capital relative to
the risks they were amassing. 3 3 When the housing bubble burst and
defaults increased, the mortgage-backed asset class also collapsed
resulting in a cascade of firm failures, mergers, and restructurings which
caused financial shock and panic.3 4 Trust and confidence in the U.S.
financial system washed away, as the health of almost all large and
midsize financial institutions was questioned, causing a severe
contraction in the real economy.35

26. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410.
27. H.R.REP.NO. 111-94, at 163 (2009).
28. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6410.
29. See Josh Clark, How can mortgage-backed securities bring down the U.S.
http://money.howstuffworks.com/mortgage-backedHOWSTUFFWORKS,
economy?,
security2.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
30. Thomas, Hennessey & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 24.
31. See Clark, supra note 29.
32. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6411.
33. Thomas, Hennessey & Holtz-Eakin, supra note 24.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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III. ABILITY-TO-REPAY AND RISK RETENTION UNDER THE DODDFRANK ACT

The United States initially responded to the financial crisis by
buying preferred stock in many of the largest financial institutions that
were deemed "too big to fail" through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP). 3 6 The government also investigated the root causes
of the financial crisis and began to draft legislation to correct the
underlying issues.37 Two years after the 2008 financial crisis, Congress
passed the Dodd-Frank Act to restore accountability and consumer
confidence in the financial system. 3 8 To combat the underlying
mortgage issues, the Dodd-Frank Act changed numerous federal laws

that regulate mortgage practices with the aim of ending predatory
lending practices and providing certain protections to borrowers and
investors. 39
A.

Creation of the Consumer FinancialProtectionBureau

Congress recognized that there was a failure of the federal
banking agencies and other regulators to address significant consumer
protection issues. 4 0 These failures were harmful to both consumers and
the banking system. 4 1 Congress concluded that the current system of
consumer protection suffered from a number of fundamental flaws that
undercut its effectiveness, "including a lack of focus resulting from
conflicting regulatory missions, fragmentation, and regulatory
arbitrage." 4 2 The banking agencies' primary mission was to ensure the
safe and sound operations of the banks rather than to protect consumers,
36. See Jesse Nankin & Krista K. Schmidt, History of U.S. Gov't Bailouts,
PROPUBLICA, http://www.propublica.org/special/govemment-bailouts (last updated Apr. 15,
2009).
37. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
38.

S. COMM. ON BANKING,

HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, IllTH CONG.,

BRIEF

SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,

at
available
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/-files/0701 10_DoddFrankWallStreetReform.co
mprehensive.summFaryjinal.pdf.
39. H.R. REP. No. 110-441, at 50-51(2007).
40
. REP. No. 111-176, at 9(2010).
41.

Id.

42. Id. at 10.
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putting consumer protection in competition with regulatory goals.4 3
The Federal Reserve Board had the main responsibility for federal
mortgage lending rules, and it did not act with a regulation regarding
mortgage practices until 2008 4 4 -far too late in the game. Furthermore,
at that time, there were seven agencies involved in consumer rule
writing or enforcement, leading to fragmentation, which undermined
accountability and caused regulatory arbitrage between federal
regulators and the states.4 5
The Dodd-Frank Act remedied these structural flaws and sought
to protect consumers by creating the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection (now commonly referred to as the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau or CFPB), which regulates how financial products or
services are offered and provided to consumers under federal law.4 6
Responsibility for the existing federal consumer protection statutes and
regulations, including the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), were
transferred from the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB.4 7 With the
CFPB's new rulemaking power, it amended TILA to implement

§ 141148 and § 141249 of the Dodd-Frank Act.50
B.

Ability to Repay

The Dodd-Frank Act amended TILA to include the
ability-to-repay requirement. 51 The CFPB alone was charged with
defining the ability-to-repay standard, providing minimum underwriting
standards for mortgages. 52 The ability-to-repay rule imposed liability
on residential mortgage lenders if they did not make a reasonable and
43. Id.
44. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in
Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 1026).
45. S.REP.No. 111-176, at 10.
46. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 12
U.S.C. § 5491 (2012).
47. See Id. § 5481(12)(0), 5581(b)(1).
48. Implementing ability-to-repay. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a) (2012).
49. Implementing the rebuttable presumption and safe harbor. See 15 U.S.C. §
1639a(d).
50. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R § 1026 (2013).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (Ability to repay under TILA).
52. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 111-94, at 48 (2009).
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good-faith determination based on verified and documented information
that the consumer had a reasonable ability to repay the loan.5 3 Under
this rule, mortgage providers would be required to lend to consumers
who have a reasonable ability to repay the mortgage at the time of
origination.54 The Dodd-Frank Act created a safe harbor and a
rebuttable presumption against ability-to-repay liability when creditors
made Qualified Mortgages.
The CFPB released its final rule for the
ability-to-repay requirement and safe harbor, defining QM, in January
2013 which became effective on January 10, 2014.56
C.

Risk Retention Requirement - Keeping "Skin in the Game"

The Dodd-Frank Act also provides protection to investors of
It requires securitizers to retain a material amount of risk,
causing them to have "skin in the game" by aligning the securitizers'
economic interests with those of investors in the ABS.58 These
protections are intended to reform mortgage lending practices to prevent
a recurrence of rising defaults and foreclosures and to protect investors
who purchase assets backed by such mortgages. 5 9
Although Congress adopted the credit risk retention rule which
requires any securitizer of ABS to retain at least 5% of the securities
risk,60 it also provided an exception to the credit risk retention rule for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) if the securitized mortgages were
Qualified Residential Mortgages. 6 1 The Dodd-Frank Act requires that
the Agencies, not including the CFPB, jointly define QRM. 62 The
Dodd-Frank Act also stipulated that the definition of QRM could not be
broader than the definition of QM, as defined under § 129C(c)(2) of
ABS. 57

53. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1).
54. Id. § 1639b(c)(3).
55. Id. § 1639c(b).
56. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6408 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1026).
57. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o-11 (2012); see
also S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11.
59. H.R. REP.No. 110-441, at 49 (2007).
60. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11(c)(1)(B)(i).
61. Id. § 78o-1 1(e)(4) (2012).
62. Id. § 78o-1 1(e)(4)(A).

370

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 18

TILA, as amended by the CFPB."
IV. RULEMAKING BY THE CFPB AND THE AGENCIES DEFINING QM AND

QRM

A.

The Agencies' FirstProposedQualifiedResidential Mortgage
Definition64

The Agencies jointly released a proposed credit risk retention
rule that defined QRM on April 29, 2011.65 The proposed risk retention
rule would have applied to securitizers of ABS 66 and required such
securitizers to retain not less than 5% of the credit risk 67 for any asset
that the securitizer transferred, sold, or conveyed to a third party,
"unless an exemption from the risk retention rules for the securities or
transaction was otherwise available."6 8 One exemption available to
securitizers stated that the risk retention rules would not apply to an

63. Id. § 78o-11(e)(4)(C).
64. See infra Appendix (side-by-side comparison of the key differences between the
original QRM proposal and the final QM definition).
65. See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(77) (defining an ABS as "a fixed-income or other security
collateralized by any type of self-liquidating financial asset (including a loan, a lease, a
mortgage, or a secured or unsecured receivable) that allows the holder of the security to
receive payments that depend primarily on cash flow from the asset, including-(i) a
collateralized mortgage obligation; (ii) a collateralized debt obligation; (iii) a collateralized
bond obligation; (iv) a collateralized debt obligation of asset-backed securities; (v) a
collateralized debt obligation of collateralized debt obligations; and (vi) a security that the
Commission, by rule, determines to be an asset-backed security for purposes of this section;
and (B) does not include a security issued by a finance subsidiary held by the parent
company or a company controlled by the parent company, if none of the securities issued by
the finance subsidiary are held by an entity that is not controlled by the parent company.").
67. The re-proposed credit risk retention rule allows sponsors to hold credit risk as an
"eligible vertical interest," an "eligible horizontal residual interest," or any combination
thereof, in a total amount equal to no less than 5% of the fair value of all ABS interests in
the issuing entity that are issued as part of the securitization transaction. Under the vertical
risk retention option, a sponsor could satisfy its risk retention requirement by retaining at
least 5% of each class of ABS interests issued as part of the securitization transaction.
Under the horizontal risk retention option, a sponsor could satisfy its risk retention
obligations by retaining a first-loss "eligible horizontal residual interest" in the issuing entity
in an amount equal to at least 5% of the par value of all ABS interests in the issuing entity
that were issued as part of the securitization transaction. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed.
Reg. 57,928, 57,936-57,937 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
68. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,099.
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issuance of ABS if all of the assets that collateralized the ABS were
Qualified Residential Mortgages. 69
Initially, the Agencies defined QRM to mean any mortgage that
was a closed-end, first-lien mortgage to purchase or refinance a
one-to-four family property with at least one unit being the principal
dwelling of the borrower.7 0 The borrower could not have certain
"derogatory factors" for the mortgage to be considered a QRM. 71 For
instance, borrowers could not be past due, in whole or in part, on any
debt obligation within two years and could not have been engaged in
certain activities such as bankruptcy within a specified amount of
time.7 2 Mortgage originators would have to verify and document
compliance with these factors within ninety days prior to closing.7 3
A QRM could not include payment terms that allowed for
interest-only payments, negative amortization, balloon payments,7 4 or
prepayment penalties. 75 For any adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), the
proposal set maximum rate increases for the life of the mortgage.7 6
Under the proposed rule, a QRM had to have a loan-to-value (LTV)
ratio of 80% or less for purchase-money mortgage transactions, 75% or
less on rate and term refinance loans,. and 70% or less for cash-out
refinance loans.77 Thus, for a purchase-money mortgage, a down
payment of at least 20% of the home's purchase price was required,

69. Id. at 24,117.
70. Id. at 24,166.
71. Id.; see also id. at 24,121.
72. Id. at 24,121-22, 24,166 (a borrower must not currently be thirty or more days past
due, in whole or in part, on any debt obligation, and the borrower must not be sixty or more
days past due, in whole or in part, on any debt obligation within the preceding twenty-four
months. A borrower must not have, within the preceding thirty-six months, been a debtor in
a bankruptcy proceeding, had property repossessed or foreclosed upon, engaged in a short
sale or deed-in-lieu of foreclosure, or been subject to a federal or state judgment for
collection of any unpaid debt).
73. Id. at 24,122, 24,166.
74. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(s)(5)(i) (2013) (defining "balloon payment" as "any scheduled
payment of principal and interest that is more than twice as large as any earlier scheduled
payment of principal and interest").
75. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,122, 24,166 ("A prepayment penalty is
defined as a penalty imposed solely because the mortgage obligation is prepaid in full or in
part. For purposes of this definition, a prepayment penalty would not include, for example,
fees imposed for preparing and providing documents in connection with prepayment, such
as a loan payoff statement, a reconveyance, or other document releasing the creditor's
security interest in the one-to-four family property securing the loan.").
76. Id.
77. Id. at 24,123, 24,167.
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with a higher equity requirement for refinancing. 7 8
The first proposal required a QRM to have a qualifying written
appraisal, which conformed to generally accepted appraisal standards.79
Additionally, the QRM proposal required two debt-to-income (DTI)
ratios, one which compared the borrower's monthly mortgage payment
with his monthly gross income (front-end ratio), and another that
compared the borrower's monthly total debts with his monthly gross
income (back-end ratio). 8 0 The proposal limited QRMs to mortgages
that had a front-end ratio of 28% and a back-end ratio of 36%.
Under the first proposal, a QRM could not be assumed by any
person who was not a borrower under the original mortgage
transaction. 82 Someone who assumes a mortgage may not meet the
QRM standards, changing the risk associated with the securitized
mortgage, which could have negative effects on the investor. 83 A QRM
under the original proposal also required the originator of a QRM to
incorporate certain requirements regarding servicing policies and
procedures for the mortgage into the mortgage transaction documents. 84
B.

The CFPB'sProposedand FinalQualified MortgageDefinition

1. The Proposed Qualified Mortgage Definition
On May 11, 2011, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (the "Board") published a proposed rule amending
TILA to include the ability-to-repay requirement and the safe harbor
and rebuttable presumption provisions, which defined QM.85 The
78. See id. at 24,124, 24,167.
79. Id. at 24,125, 24,167 (Generally accepted appraisal standards are evidenced by the
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice, the appraisal requirements of the
federal banking agencies, and applicable laws).
80. Id. at 24,125, 24,166.
81. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,125, 24,166.
82. Id. at 24,126-27, 24,167.
83. Id. at 24,126-27.
84. Id. at 24,127, 24,167 (servicing policies and procedures included information
regarding loss mitigation actions, subordinate liens, and the responsibility for assumption of
these requirements if the servicing rights with respect to the QRM were sold or transferred
to another business entity).
85. Regulation Z; Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. 27,390 (proposed May 11, 2011) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 226).
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proposal mentioned other recent actions that the Board had been
involved with including its joint effort, as a member of the Agencies, to
implement the credit risk retention rule which defines QRM.86 The
proposed rule acknowledged that the Agencies defined QRM by taking
into consideration underwriting and product features that historical
loan-performance data indicated resulted in a lower risk of default and
that QRM could be no broader than the definition of a QM under
TILA.8 7 QRM was not discussed any further in the Board's proposal
defining QM. 88
The proposal included two alternative definitions for QM
because the Board was concerned with ambiguity surrounding whether
QM created a safe harbor or a rebuttable presumption. 89 The first
alternative defined a QM based on the criteria listed in the Dodd-Frank
Act and operated as a legal safe harbor and alternative to complying
with the general ability-to-repay standard. 90 It did not include a
requirement to consider the consumer's DTI ratio or residual income.9 1
The second alternative defined a QM to include the requirements listed
in the Dodd-Frank Act as well as other underwriting requirements that
are in the general ability-to-repay standard such as employment status,
simultaneous loans, current debt obligations, DTI ratio, and credit
history. 92 This alternative provided a presumption of compliance that
could be rebutted by the consumer. 93
Although the Board actively participated in defining both QM
and QRM, the two definitions differed greatly. 94 Neither QM
alternative included a down payment requirement, LTV ratio
requirement, any written appraisal requirement, any assumability
requirement, or any servicing standards. 95 Furthermore, only one
alternative required a QM to consider a borrower's DTI ratio, which did

86. Id. at 27,393-94.
87. Id. at 27,394.
88. See id. at 27,390-506.
89. Id. at 27,396, 27,484-85.
90. Id. at 27,396, 27,484.
91. Regulation Z; Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. at 27,396, 27,484.
92. Id. at 27,396, 27,484-85.
93. Id.
94. See id.; Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,122, 24,166-67 (proposed Apr. 29,
2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43) (criteria for QRM exemption).
95. See Regulation Z; Truth in Lending, 76 Fed. Reg. at 27,396, 27,484-85.
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not give a quantitative standard, 96 and only one alternative considered
standards related to a borrower's credit history. 97 The Board requested
comments on both QM alternatives while the Agencies also sought
comments on the QRM definition released two weeks earlier.98
2. The CFPB's Final Qualified Mortgage Definition
Effective July 21, 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act transferred the
Board's rulemaking authority for TILA to the CFPB.99 On January 30,
2013, the CFPB published a final rule amending TILA to include the
ability-to-repay requirement and a safe harbor and rebuttable
presumption, which defined QM. 00 The CFPB's final QM rule
provides a safe harbor and presumption of compliance with the
ability-to-repay requirement for mortgages that are not high-priced
loans and a rebuttable presumption for mortgages considered
high-priced loans.' 0 ' The CFPB's final rule recognized the continued
fragility of the mortgage market and the effects that its definition of QM
could have on other rulemaking under the Dodd-Frank Act, such as

defining QRM.1 02
The CFPB explained that the credit risk retention requirement,
defining QRM, was "aimed at addressing weaknesses and failures in the
securitization process and the securitization markets."' 03 The rule noted
that the Agencies, not including the CFPB, were tasked with
implementing the credit risk retention requirement.104 The final rule
included the Agencies' proposed QRM definition and stated that the
CFPB worked with the Agencies so that QRM would be no broader

96. The Board did not want to set a quantitative standard for DTI because it feared it
could limit credit availability without providing adequate off-setting benefits. Id. at 27,460.
97. Id. at 27,396.
98. See id.; Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,122.
99. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6418 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1026).
100. See id. at 6408.
101. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e).
102. Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. at 6412.
103. Id. at 6416.
104. Id.
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than QM as mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act. 0 5 Although both QM
and QRM are designed to address problems that arose in the
mortgage-origination process, the CFPB noted that the QM and QRM
definitions are "distinct and relate[d] to different parts of the
Dodd-Frank Act with different purposes." 0 6 Furthermore, the final rule
stated that while the CFPB's QM definition set the outer limits of a
QRM, the Agencies had the option under the Dodd-Frank Act to define
QRM in a way that was narrower than the QM definition. 07
Unlike the QRM proposal which had only one QRM definition
for all applicable mortgages, the CFPB's final ability-to-repay rule
provided multiple definitions for QM.'08 The QM definitions fell into
three main categories: general QMs, Government- Sponsored
Enterprise (GSE) eligible QMs, and small-creditor QMs.1 09 In general,
a QM is any consumer credit transaction that is secured by a
dwelling, 0 including any real property attached to a dwelling except
for certain exempt transactions."' A QM is a transaction that provides
for regular periodic payments that are substantially equal (except for
adjustable-rate or step-rate mortgages) that do not increase the principal
balance, allow deferred repayment of principal, or create a balloon
payment with some exceptions.112 A QM cannot have a loan term that
exceeds thirty years or have total points and fees payable in connection

105.

Id. at 6417.

106.

Id.

107. Id.
108. Compare Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,117-27 (proposed Apr.
29, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43), with 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2) (QM
defined-generally); (e)(4) (QM defined-special rules); (e)(5) (QM defined-small
creditor portfolio loans); (e)(6) (QM defined-temporary balloon payments); (f) (balloon
payment QM made by certain creditors).
109. What
is a Qualified Mortgage?, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201310 cfpb qm-guide-for-lenders.pdf (last visited Nov.
6, 2013).
110. "Dwelling means a residential structure that contains one to four units, whether or
not that structure is attached to real property. The term includes an individual condominium
unit, cooperative unit, mobile home, and trailer, if it is used as a residence." 12 C.F.R. §
1026.2(a)(19).
111. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(a) (exempt transactions). Unlike the original QRM definition,
12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(a) does not require at least one property to be the principle residence of
the borrower. Compare id., with Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,120 (showing
that the originally proposed QRM standard required at least one property to be the principle
residence of the borrower).
112. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(i).
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with the loan exceeding certain specified amounts. 13 Furthermore, to
be eligible as a QM, the creditor must underwrite the loan accounting
for any monthly payments for mortgage-related obligations.114
Under the final QM definition, a creditor must consider and
verify at or before the consummation of the loan the "consumer's
current or reasonably expected income or assets other than the value of
the dwelling . .. that secures the loan."' 1 5
The final rule also
established that the consumer's monthly DTI ratio cannot exceed 43%
at the time the loan is consummated.1 16 Similar to the Board's proposed
QM definition, the CFPB did not adopt key features from the Agencies
proposed QRM definition in any of its final QM definitions such as a
down payment requirement, a LTV ratio requirement, a written
appraisal requirement, an assumability requirement, or any servicing
standards. 1 17
C.

The Agencies Re-Proposed QualifiedResidentialMortgage
Definition"l8

After receiving a substantial amount of negative feedback
concerning the first proposed credit risk retention rule, the Agencies
jointly released an amended proposed credit risk retention rule that
redefined QRM on August 28, 2013."9 Consistent with the original
proposal, the re-proposal also applies to securitizers issuing ABS and
would require such "securitizer[s] to retain not less than [5%] of the
credit risk for any asset that the securitizer, through the issuance of an

113. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(ii)-(iii); see also id. § 1026.43(e)(3) (setting total point and fee
limitations).
114. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(iv) (using the maximum interest rate that may apply
during the first five years after the date on which the first regular periodic payment will be
due and the periodic payments of principal and interest that repay the outstanding principal
balance using the maximum interest rate or the loan amount over the loan term).
115. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(v) (the creditor must also consider and verify the consumer's
current debt obligations, alimony, and child support payments).
116. Id. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
117. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43.
118. See infra Appendix (side-by-side comparison of the key differences between the
original QRM proposal and the final QM definition).
119. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,933 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43); SEC ProposedRules, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMIssIoN, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed.shtml (last visited Feb. 1, 2014) (showing
that the proposed rule was released on August 28, 2013).
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ABS, transfers, sells, or conveys to a third party, unless an exemption
from the risk retention requirements for the securities or transaction is
otherwise available."1 20
Due to an overwhelming majority of negative comments
concerning the original definition of QRM from "individuals, industry
participants, (e.g., real estate brokers, mortgage bankers, securitization
sponsors), insurance companies, public interest groups, state agencies,
financial institutions, and trade organizations," the Agencies jointly
decided to amend the original QRM definition. 121 Most of the negative
comments were focused on the original proposal's down payment
requirement, LTV ratios, and DTI ratios.122 Many commenters argued
that the proposed QRM definition was too narrow, especially with
respect to the LTV and DTI requirements, because it disadvantaged
first-time homebuyers and low- and moderate-income persons.123 These
commenters asserted that the proposed QRM definition would prevent
recovery of the housing market by restricting available credit and make
it difficult for private capital to compete with GSEs, stifling the return
of private capital to the mortgage market.124 The Agencies were
strongly encouraged by members of Congress to eliminate or modify
the down payment requirement because "the proposed 20% down
payment requirement was inconsistent with legislative intent." 25
In response to the negative comments, the Agencies' re-proposal
broadened and simplified the scope of the original QRM definition by
defining QRM to have the same meaning as QM as defined in § 129C
of TILAl 26 and implemented by CFPB regulation. 127 The Agencies
recognized that the CFPB provided several definitions for a QM and
proposed that a QRM would be a loan that meets any of the QM
definitions under TILA.128 QRM equating to QM is a major overhaul of
the original QRM definition because it excludes any down payment

120. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,935.
121. Id. at 57,988-89.
122. See id. at 57,988.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See 15 U.S.C. 1639(c).
127. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,989.
128. Id. at 57,991; see also 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2), (e)(4), (e)(5), (e)(6), (f) (QM
definitions under TILA).
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requirement, LTV ratio requirement, standards related to a borrower's
credit history, any written appraisal requirement, any assumability
requirement, and any servicing standards that were key features of the
original QRM definition.' 29
The Agencies stated that they changed the original QRM
definition because they believe setting QRM to mean QM meets the
statutory goals and directive of the credit risk retention rule under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 "to limit credit risk, preserve[]
access to affordable credit, and facilitate[] compliance."' 3 0
The
Agencies believe that the QM standards combined with the general
ability-to-repay rules provide a better level of risk'31 to qualify as a
QRM by restricting certain product features and lax underwriting
practices that contributed significantly to the financial crisis.132 They
are also worried about imposing further limitations on mortgage credit
availability because such limitations could "disproportionately affect
groups that have historically been disadvantaged in the mortgage
market, such as lower income, minority, or first-time homebuyers." 3 3
The Agencies noted potential risks that could arise from setting QRM to
mean QM but believe them to be smaller than the risks associated with
two distinct definitions.' 34
1. Alternative QRM Definition - QM-Plus
Within the re-proposed credit risk retention rule, the Agencies
provided an alternative definition to "QRM means QM," referred to as
"QM-plus."'3 5 The QM-plus definition was considered alongside the
"QRM means QM" definition.1 36 The Agencies are seeking feedback
on QM-plus in addition to the primary "QRM means QM" definition.137
The QM-plus definition would take the QM criteria as a starting point

129.
130.
131.
rate for
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,992.
Id. at 57,989.
The agencies show a 23% default rate for QM loans compared to a 44% default
non-QM loans. See id. at 57,989-90.
Id. at 57,989-90.
Id. at 57,991.
See id. at 57,990-91.
Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,993.
See Id.
Id.
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for the QRM definition, and then incorporate four additional standards
intended to cut down the risk of default.' 3 8 Consequently, under
QM-plus, a large number of loans would not likely qualify as a QRM,
and thus would not gain an exemption from the credit risk retention
rule. 139
The most controversial requirement under the QM-plus
definition states that a QRM-eligible mortgage cannot have a LTV ratio
exceeding 70% at the time of closing.140 Thus, a QM-plus mortgage
must have a minimum down payment of 30% of the purchase price of
the home even though a majority of the commenters disliked the
original QRM definition for having a 20% down payment
requirement. 141 Because QM-plus started with the core QM criteria, a
QRM would be required to include the QM's requirements for product
type, loan term, points and fees, underwriting, income and debt
verification, and DTI ratio.142 Therefore, QM-plus requires the
borrower's DTI ratio not to exceed 43% instead of setting limits to a
borrower's front-end and back-end DTI ratios as the original QRM
definition proposed.143
Under QM-plus, mortgages that qualify as QMs because they
meet the CFPB's provisions for balloon loan provisions, GSE-eligible
covered transactions, or small-creditor exceptions would not be
considered QRMs.1 44 Like the original QRM proposal, only loans that
constituted the principal dwelling of the borrower would qualify as a
QRM under the QM-plus definition.14 5 Furthermore, under the
QM-plus definition, all QRMs would be required to be first-lien
mortgages.1 46 Also like the original QRM proposal, borrowers cannot
have certain derogatory factors under QM-plus in order to qualify as a

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 57,994 (In other words, the QM-plus approach would require a 30% down
payment.).
141. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,994 (30% down payment requirement);
Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,124 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43) (20% down payment requirement).
142. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,993; see also 12 C.F.R. §
1026.43(e)(2) (re-proposal's alternative definition to QRM).
143. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,993; 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)(2)(vi).
144. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,993.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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QRM. 147
The Agencies recognized that a definition that equates QRM
with QM covers a significant portion of the historical mortgage market
and most of the present mortgage market.148 QM-plus, like the original
QRM proposal, was meant to capture a significantly smaller portion of
the mortgage market requiring securitizers to retain risk for QMs that do
not meet the additional four factors.149 Comments on the re-proposed
credit risk retention rule, including the definitions of "QRM meaning
QM" and QM-plus, had to be submitted by October 30, 2013.150
V. QRM SHOULD NOT EQUAL QM

Co-sponsor to the Dodd-Frank Act, Representative Barney
Frank, stated that the provision requiring mortgage securitizers to keep
skin in the game was the "single most important part of [the] bill."15 1
The agencies that have been empowered by Congress to create the
standards for the credit risk retention rule and define QRM have given
too much weight to industry opinion by allowing the definition of QRM
to equate to QM as defined under § 129C of TILA.152 By defining
QRM to mean QM, the Agencies have punted their responsibility to
require risk retention by creating the broadest definition of QRM
possible.153 This was not Congress's intention when it created the credit
risk retention rule, the "single most important part of [the] bill,"l 54

147. Id. at 57,993-94 (requiring the originator to determine that the borrower was not
currently thirty or more days past due on any debt obligation and the borrower had not been
sixty or more days past due on any debt obligations within the preceding twenty-four
months; furthermore, the borrower must not have been a debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding
within the preceding thirty-six months or been subject to a judgment for collection of an
unpaid debt, had personal property repossessed, had any one-to-four family property
foreclosed upon, or engaged in a short sale or deed in lieu of foreclosure).
148. Id. at 57,994.
149. Id.
150. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,928.
151. Gao, supra note 1.
152. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,989.
153. See Christopher Whalen, Washington & Wall Street: Does Barney Frank Have
"Skin In The Game"?, BREITBART (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/BigGovernment/2013/09/06/Washington-Wall-Street-Does-Bamey-Frank-Have-Skin-in-theGame; see also Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o11 (e)(4)(C) (2012) (limiting the definition of QRM to be no broader than QM under § 129C
of TILA).
154. Gao, supra note 1.
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requiring securitizers of residential mortgages to keep some skin in the
game. 155
A.

Legislative Purposeof QRM and QM Under the Dodd-Frank
Act

1. QRM Under The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 - Protecting
Investors
A major concern of Congress while drafting the Dodd-Frank
Act was how to draft legislation that would prevent a reoccurrence of
Wall-Street-fueled bad lending and toxic securitization. 15 6 In 2009, the
House of Representatives passed the Mortgage Reform and
Anti-Predatory Lending Act (MRAPL) which introduced the credit risk
retention rules. 15 7 MRAPL would have required creditors to retain
some material portion of risk from MBS they sold to the secondary
market.' 58 The notion behind risk retention was that it was extremely
important for creditors who participated in the secondary market to keep
some "skin in the game."l 59 However, critics were concerned about
how the credit risk retention legislation would work in practice, and
whether the proposed exceptions to the rule were too narrow.160
The MRAPL introduced the credit risk retention rule as an
amendment to TILA § 129C.161 The amendment also provided an

155. See 156 CONG. REc. S3576 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson) (explaining the importance of only excluding mortgages with certain traits that
would historically be good performing loans).
156. See Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American
Mortgage System: Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts.and Consumer Credit, 11 Ith Cong.
173 (2009) (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending); 155 CONG. REC.
H5316 (daily ed. May 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis Cardoza).
157. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 213
(2009) (this is the first time the credit risk retention legislation appears in any proposed
bills).
158. Id. § 213(l)(1).
159. See generally H.R. REP. No. 111-94, at 165 (2009) (discussing importance of
having "skin in the game"); Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the
American Mortgage System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer
Credit, 111th Cong. 173 (2009) (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible
Lending) (same).
160. H.R. REP. No. 111-94, at 165 (2009).
161. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 213
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exception to the risk retention rule for creditors who sold mortgages that
were QMs as defined under § 129C(c)(2)(A) to the secondary market.' 62
At this time, the QM definition used for the credit risk retention rule
was the same QM definition used for the ability-to-repay rule under
TILA.163 It appeared that Congress's intent for credit risk retention was
aligned with protecting consumers from receiving mortgages they could
not afford by forcing creditors to use a higher underwriting standard if
they did not want to retain risk from the mortgages they were
originating. 164
However, the Dodd-Frank Act moved the credit risk retention
rule from TILA to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.165 This
removed the focus of risk retention from the mortgage originator to the
securitizer.166 The Dodd-Frank Act also created the CFPB, which is
focused on protecting the consumer. 167 The creation of the CFPB
allowed Congress's attention to focus on the concern that capital-market
participants have little to no skin in the game.168
Congress's goal was to make sure investors could have
confidence in the quality of the assets that are utilized in
securitization.169 Congress believes that for securitizers to have "skin in

the game" they need to retain a material amount of risk.170 This aligns
the interests of investors in asset-backed securities with the securitizers'
economic interests.171 Therefore, securitizers who must retain risk
"have a strong incentive to monitor the quality of the assets they
purchase from originators, package into securities, and sell" on the

(2009).
162. Id. § 213(1)(1).
163. See id
164. See id. Section 213 and 203 are both amendments to TILA and use the same
definition for QM. See id.; id. § 203.
165. See Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11
(2012).
166. See id. (removing the credit risk retention rule from TILA and adding it as an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
167. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 11 (2010) (discussing why CFPB was created).
168. See Consumer Protectionsin FinancialServices: Past Problems, Future Solutions:
Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. 17 (2009) (statement
of Patricia A. McCoy, Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law).
169. 156 CONG. REc. S3591 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mike Crapo)
(speaking on the importance of risk retention to those who securitize assets).
170. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129(2010).
171.

Id.
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secondary market. 172 It was believed that no one party should be able to
pass on all the risk to someone else. 7 3 Everyone should share the
responsibility for the underlying financial products so that the
securitizers of financial products "have as much skin in the game when
they package the products as the consumers do when they buy them." 74
When Congress shifted its focus to securitizers who retain credit
risk, the exemption given to creditors who met QM standards under
TILA was replaced with newly created QRM standards specific to
investor safety.' 75 The QRM definition was created to give an
exemption to securitizers who sold RMBS containing only mortgages
that had a very low risk of default even in a stressful economic
environment, which combined high unemployment with sharp drops in
home prices.1 76 The drafters of the QRM standard believed that it
would exempt only mortgages like those made in "the
good-old-days." 77
A good-old-day mortgage required that the
consumer was actually qualified to borrow the loan amount, that there
was a significant down payment from the borrower (or mortgage
insurance in its place), and that the consumer had a good
debt-to-income ratio. 78 Furthermore, the drafters of QRM believed that
securitizing mortgages that have a 20% down payment and a high credit
rating did not require the same level of skin in the game as mortgages
that did not have those elements.179
Although the drafters of QRM wanted to see a return to the type
of mortgages originated in former times, there was heavy criticism of
requiring a mandatory down payment for fear of creating standards that

172. Id.
173. Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets: Before
the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Sen.
Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
174. Id.
175. See 156 CONG. REc. S3575 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mary
Landrieu) (moving, on behalf of the Senate Small Business Committee, to replace QM with
QRM).
176. Edward Pinto, A Qualified Residential Mortgage a Qualified Mortgage, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (Aug. 28, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.aei-ideas.org/2013/08/a-qualifiedresidential-mortgage-%E2%89%AO-a-qualified-mortgage/.
177. 156 CONG. REc. S3576 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson).
178. See id.
179. Id. (explaining the importance of only excluding risk retention for mortgages with
certain traits that would historically be good performing loans).
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would shut out qualified low- and moderate-income borrowers. 180
initial amendment to the credit risk retention rule proposed a fixed 5%
down payment requirement.' 8 1 The amendment was voted down in
favor of another more flexible amendment with mortgage underwriting
standards, a requirement to verify income and assets, and no minimum
down payment requirement.1 82 Down payment requirements were still
considered very important to the drafters of QRM, but it was thought
that a QRM definition which required mortgage insurance could cover
the risk for any down payment under 20% and allow access to credit for
those individuals who could not afford to put 20% down.18 3 The
drafters of QRM hoped that regulators would ensure that a broad
spectrum of qualified borrowers fell under the QRM exception
umbrella. 184 Eventually, Congress adopted the Landrieu-Isakson
amendment, with minor changes, which reflects the language defining
QRM under of the Dodd-Frank Act.'
In defining QRM, Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act states that
any exception or exemption under the credit risk retention rule should
meet the following criteria: (1) help ensure high quality underwriting
standards for the securitizers and originators of assets that are
securitized or available for securitization; and (2) encourage appropriate
risk-management practices by the securitizers and originators of assets,
improve the access of consumers and businesses to credit on reasonable
terms, or otherwise be in the public interest and for the protection of
investors. 186 Congress further guided the Agencies in creating the QRM
definition by instructing them to look at underwriting and product
features that historical loan performance data indicated results in a
lower risk of default.' 8 7
180. 156 CONG. REc. S3520 (daily ed. May 11, 2010) (statement of Sen. Christopher J.
Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs) (stating that mandatory 5%
down payment requirement in Corker amendment is overly burdensome).
181. Id. at S3519.
182. See 156 CONG. REC. S3574 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (The Merkley Amendment
passed by a 63-36 vote while the Corker Amendment lost by 42-57 vote.).
183. 156 CONG. REc. S10442 (Dec. 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnny Isakson)
(noting that need for a 20% down payment was not needed if lower down payments were
coupled with mortgage insurance).
184. Id.
185. See H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 529 (2010) (Conf. Rep.).
186. Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-l l(e)(2)
(2012).
187. Id. § 78o-ll(e)(4).
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These underwriting and product features include documentation
and verification of the financial resources used to qualify a borrower.' 88
Other features to be considered are the residual income of the borrower
after all monthly obligations have been considered (debt-to-income
ratio), the ratio of the housing payments of the borrower to the monthly
income of the borrower (front-end ratio), and the ratio of total monthly
installment payments of the borrower to the income of the borrower
(back-end ratio).189 Features such as mitigating the potential for
payment shock on adjustable-rate mortgages, the presence or absence of
mortgage insurance, and restricting the use of balloon payments,
negative amortization, prepayment penalties, interest-only payments,
and other high risk features should also be considered under the
definition of QRM.1 90 In addition to taking certain features into
consideration for the QRM definition, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically
prohibited the definition of QRM to be any broader than the definition
of QM as provided under § 129C(c)(2) of TILA and regulations adopted
thereunder by the CFPB.191
2. QM Under TILA - Protecting Consumers

Unlike the definition of QRM, QM was originally conceived
before the financial crisis as part of proposed legislation aimed at
preventing predatory lending. 192 Congress was particularly concerned
with lenders steering borrowers to mortgages that the consumer could
not afford, did not provide a net tangible benefit to consumers, treated
borrowers differently based on their race or their economic standing, or
had other predatory characteristics.1 93 In order to combat the problem
of lenders steering borrowers into mortgages they could not afford, the
ability-to-repay legislation was proposed.194 Under the ability-to-repay
188. Id. § 78o-1 1(e)(4)(B)(i).
189. Id. § 78o-1 1(e)(4)(B)(ii)(I)-(III).
190. Id. § 78o-1l(e)(4)(B)(iii)-(v).
191. Id. § 78o-11(e)(4)(C).
192. See generally Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act of 2007, H.R.
3915, 110th Cong. § 203 (2007) (providing the first QM definition under TILA and a safe
harbor and rebuttable presumption section).
193. 153 CONG. REc. H13965 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2007) (statement of Rep. David Scott)
(discussing the concerns that the proposed bill, with the QM definition, is supposed to
remedy).
194. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(c) (2013) (ability to repay codified in CFPB regulations under
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legislation, no creditor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the
creditor makes a reasonable and good-faith determination based on
verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is
consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan,
according to its terms, all applicable taxes, insurance, and
assessments. 195
Proposed legislation also included a safe harbor and rebuttable
presumption to the ability-to-repay rule limiting liability on originators
if the mortgages they sold met certain criteria.' 96 Originally, proposed
legislation provided an irrebuttable presumption for mortgages that met
the definition of a QM and a rebuttable presumption for mortgages that
met the definition of a "qualified safe harbor mortgage" (QSHM).19 7
However, the QSHM definition was soon replaced with the QM
definition.198 The original definition of QM was narrow and included
residential mortgages that constituted a first lien on a dwelling or real
property that had an annual percentage ratel 99 not equal to or in excess
of certain securities issued by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 00 It also
included any residential mortgage loan that was not a first lien on the
dwelling or real property that had an annual percentage rate 20 1 not equal
to or in excess of certain securities issued by the Secretary of the

TILA).
195. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1) (2012)
(ability to repay under TILA).
196. Id. § 1639c(b).
197. H.R. 3915.
198. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 203
(2009) (showing that the definition of QSHM has been revised and replaced with QM).
199. First lien on a dwelling or real property that: "(I) has an annual percentage rate that
does not equal or exceed the yield on securities issued by the Secretary of the Treasury
under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, that bear comparable periods of maturity
by more than 3 percentage points; or (II) has an annual percentage rate that does not equal
or exceed the most recent conventional mortgage rate, or such other annual percentage rate
as may be established by regulation under paragraph (6), by more than 175 basis points."
H.R. 3915 at § 203.
200. Id.
201. Not a first lien on the dwelling or real property that: "(I) has an annual percentage
rate that does not equal or exceed the yield on securities issued by the Secretary of the
Treasury under chapter 31 of title 31, United States Code, that bear comparable periods of
maturity by more than 5 percentage points; or (II) has an annual percentage rate that does
not equal or exceed the most recent conventional mortgage rate, or such/ other annual
percentage rate as may be established by regulation under paragraph (6), by inore than 375
basis points; and (iii) a loan made or guaranteed by the Secretary of Veterans 'Affairs." Id.
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Treasury. 202
Many members of Congress worried that the narrow definition
of QM was going to have the unintended consequence of restricting
mortgage credit availability for traditional loans.20 3 Congress decided
that the agency charged with defining QM should have the flexibility to
expand the definition of QM to make the safe harbor as broad as
possible while still preventing predatory lending.20 4 It did this by
allowing the agency to prescribe regulations that "revise, add to, or
subtract from the criteria that define a qualified mortgage upon a finding
that such regulations are necessary or proper to ensure that responsible,
affordable mortgage credit remains available to consumers." 20 5
Congress expanded the QM definition throughout the legislative
process to include nontraditional mortgage products that met certain
criteria and also offered alternative QM definitions.20 6 Congress left the
final say over the definition of QM with the newly created CFPB by
granting it the power to amend TILA, under which the QM definition
falls. 207 The CFPB created a broad QM definition in its final rule,
providing a safe harbor and a rebuttable presumption that the borrower
satisfies the ability-to-repay rules when a lender's mortgages comply
with the QM definition.2 08
Congress Intendedfor QRM and QM to be Different

B.

One indication that Congress believed QRM should not mean
QM is the simple fact that Congress chose different terms, showing that
Congress thought that the different purpose behind each provision

202.

Id.

203. See H.R. 1728, The Mortgage Reform And Anti-PredatoryLending Act of 2009:
HearingBefore the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 4 (2009) (statement of Rep. Shelley
M. Capito) (discussing her concerns with the narrow QM definition hurting credit
availability and treating safe loans such as those insured by the FHA as predatory loans).
204. See H.R. REP. No. 111-517, at 785 (2009).
205. Id.
206. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c (2013).
207. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12)(0) (2010) (showing that TILA falls under the CFPB's
authority).
208. Ability to Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending
Act

(Regulation

Z),

CONSUMER

FIN.

PROTECTION

BUREAU,

http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/ability-to-repay-and-qualified-mortgagestandards-under-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
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justified a different definition. 209 Furthermore, Congress moved the
credit risk retention requirement from TILA 2 10 into the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.211 TILA was created with the intention of
protecting consumers in their dealings with lenders and creditors. 212
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was created to provide oversight
of securities transactions in the secondary market, regulate the
exchanges, and regulate broker-dealers in order to protect the investing
public.213 By moving the credit risk retention rule to the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Congress was trying to protect investors
purchasing ABS in the secondary market.2 14
Originally under TILA, the credit risk retention rule used the
QM definition for its exceptions. 215 However, Congress moved the
credit risk retention rule into the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
in order to protect investors in the secondary market by creating a
completely new standard, QRM.2 16 Furthermore, Congress sought to
exempt risk retention for entities that packaged and sold MBS that met
the requirements of a QRM, 2 1 7 which would have a very "low risk of
default even in a stressful economic environment[] combining high
unemployment with sharp drops in home prices." 21 8 QRM meaning
QM "clearly does not pass muster under any low risk standard" because
QMs can have no down payment, a credit score in the bottom
one-eighth of all scores, and a 50% or greater DTI ratio if approved by
certain GSEs. 219
209. See 156 CONG. REc. S3575 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mary
Landrieu) (showing the Senate Small Business Committee moved to define the QRM
exception).
210. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. § 213
(2009) (showing that the original risk retention was set up under TILA).
211. Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11 (2013)
(showing that the credit risk retention rule has been removed from TILA and added as an
amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
212. See generally Truth In Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2013) (discussing
the purpose of TILA).
213. See generally Securities Exchange Act Of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2013)
(discussing the purpose of the act).
214. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
215. H.R. 1728.
216. See Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-11
(2013).
217. See id.
218. Pinto, supra note 176 (original quotation omitted).
219. Id.
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Another indication that QRM was not intended to mean QM is
that Congress specifically created QRM when it could have easily
preserved the QM definition. Indeed, QM was already in existence and
was originally used as the standard for credit risk retention under
TILA.22 0 If Congress intended for QRM to mean QM under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, why not direct the CFPB to create the
standard in TILA and tell the Agencies to adopt the CFPB's final
definition? Congress did not do that because QM was meant to define a
minimum loan standard while QRM was meant to define a low risk
loan. 22 ' These two goals do not necessarily overlap.
Furthermore, the goals of borrowers and the goals of investors
are completely different and should have protections that take those
differences into account instead of trying to create a one-size-fits-all
standard, which is a consequence of equating QRM and QM. 222 CFPB
Director Richard Cordray even seemed surprised when the Agencies
announced that QRM would mean QM when he stated that the "CFPB's
ability-to-repay rule [defining QM] is consciously designed to protect
consumers from unaffordable credit" and is "not a credit risk rule
designed for investor protection which is what QRM is concerned
with." 223 Another high ranking official at the CFPB called the CFPB's
"role in crafting both standards [QM and QRM] . . . a weird
outcome." 224 The shock stems from Congress's intention for QM to
"boost underwriting standards while QRM exists to provide investors
with a class of ultra-safe loans." 225
Another signal that Congress did not intend for QRM to mean
QM is the fact that QM was created with the intention of ensuring that
the maximum number of traditional loans fell under the QM safe harbor
umbrella.22 6 QM is also subject to change by CFPB regulation, which
§

220.

See H.R. 1728 at

221.
222.

Pinto, supranote 176.
See Mike Ferullo, Regulators Ease Standardsfor Mortgages Exempt From Risk

Retention

Mandate,

213.

BANKING

DAILY

(Aug.

29,

2013),

http://news.bna.com/bdln/BDLNWB/split display.adp?fedfid=36037049&vname=bbdbulall
issues&fcn=l&wsn=1&fn=36037049&split=0 (statement by Richard Corday, Director of
CFPB).
223. Id.
224. Joe Adler, Why the CFPB Could Gain Monopoly Over Mortgage Rules, AM.
BANKER, Oct. 7, 2013, at 3.
225. See id.
226. Natter, supra note 8, at 12.
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means that the QM definition can become broader at any time. 227 if
QM subsequently changes and becomes broader, then QRM will also
become broader regardless of whether the additional mortgages
included within QM are of very high credit quality. 228 Regulators
whose focus is primarily on a borrower's ability to repay likely will not
be tailoring changes to the rule in order to address the capital markets
goals of QRM. 229 This approach does not coincide with Congress's
intention to provide an exemption from keeping skin in the game for
only those mortgages with a very high credit quality. 23 0
Congress created the credit risk retention rule with the goal that
securitizers would have some skin in the game. 23 1 Congress intended to
give securitizers an exemption to risk retention if their financial
products were made up of certain low risk mortgages that had features
such as a high down payment or mortgage insurance, because the same
level of risk retention would not be required due to the fact that these
loans historically perform well.23 2 With securitizers retaining credit
risk, investors could have confidence in the quality of the assets that are
utilized in a securitization.2 33
Defining QRM to mean QM greatly expands the universe of
mortgages that may be securitized without the securitizer having to
retain any risk.234 In 2012, 85% of residential mortgages were insured
by the FHA or bought by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.235 Under the
QRM-QM definition, 85% of residential mortgages could have been
securitized and sold to investors without the securitizer keeping any

227. Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(3)(B)(i)
(2013) (allowing QM to be revised, added to, or subtracted from).
228. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,991-92 (proposed Sept. 20,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43) (commenting that if QRM=QM, any QM will now
qualify for an exemption to risk retention under the new definition).
229. Adler, supra note 224.
230. Pinto, supra note 176 (discussing the purpose of QRM definition).
231. S. REP.No. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
232. See 156 CONG. REC. S3576 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mary
Landrieu) (explaining that certain features within loans would not require risk retention).
233. 156 CONG. REc. S3591 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mike Crapo).
234. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,979 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
235. Robert C. Pozen, How to CreateAnother Housing Crisis, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11,
2013,

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324094704579065292392851168.html.
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skin in the game.2 36 Creating a broad QRM definition "could blunt the
risk retention rule's ability to raise market confidence" in mortgage
securitizations which, of course, was its intended purpose.2 37 QRM
meaning QM makes credit risk retention the exception while Congress
intended credit risk retention to be the rule.238
Another sign that Congress did not intend for QRM to mean
QM is that Congress specifically instructed the Agencies to look at
underwriting and product features such as loans without prepayment
penalties or balloon payments that historical loan performance data
indicated resulted in a lower risk of default when defining QRM. 239 By
setting QRM to mean QM, Congress's instructions are being
disregarded because some mortgages may qualify as a QM even if the
mortgages contain prepayment penalties or balloon payments. 24 0 if
QRM means QM, then the same high-risk features Congress did not
want in QRMs could be exempt and securitized without the securitizer
having to retain any risk.24 1 Furthermore, a QM neither requires a down
payment nor requires mortgage insurance in the absence of a down
payment as Congress intended in order to qualify as a QRM.24 2 This is
a further indication that QRM was not meant to mean QM as defined
under § 129C of TILA.

236. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,992 (showing GSE mortgages are
QRM eligible).
237. Mark Zandi & Cristian deRitis, The Skinny on Skin in the Game, MOODY'S
ANALYTICS (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/Insight/EconomicAnalysis/Housing/03- 11-11 -The-Skinny-on-Skin-in-the-Game.ashx (discussing the risks of
having a broad QRM definition).
238. See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129 (2010); Enhancing Investor Protection and the
Regulation of Securities Markets: HearingBefore the Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
239. See Investor Protection and Securities Reform Act of 2010, 15 U.S.C. § 78o11 (e)(4) (2012).
240. See 12 C.F.R. § 1026.43(e)-(g) (section (e) gives the general definition for QM, (f)
allows for certain loans to have balloon payments, and (g) allows for prepayment penalties
for some loans).
241. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,991-92 (QRM is equal to QM).
242. 156 CONG. REc. S10442 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson) (stating the need for mortgage insurance for individuals who could not meet a
minimum down payment requirement under QRM).
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Negative Feedback Should Not Translate to QRM Meaning QM

Although the Agencies received a large amount of negative
feedback on the original QRM proposal, the Agencies need to look
carefully at the complaining parties. Realtors were among the most
vocal groups against a narrowly defined QRM standard.2 43 Realtors are
incentivized to get consumers approved for any kind of loan, risky or
not, so that they can sell homes and earn commissions.2 44 This is
almost the exact opposite of Congress's goal of ensuring that QRMs are
of very high credit quality.245 Investors, the group credit risk retention
and QRM should protect, supported the kinds of loan-to-value, credit
history, and debt-to-income factors the Agencies originally proposed.24 6
The Agencies should "be mindful of the points raised by commenters,
[but] ultimately they must apply their experience and expertise" in the
manner that Congress intended irrespective of the volume of negative
comments.247
QRM might not have been intended to have a 20% down
payment requirement, but its drafters relied on other protections such as
mortgage insurance to keep QRMs of very high credit quality.2 48
Congress believed that by requiring mortgage insurance, it would
ensure that the QRM exemption would "serve those consumers that
could not afford a 20% down payment while putting substantial private
capital at risk to drive underwriting discipline." 249 The drafters of QRM
wanted a broad spectrum of high-credit-quality mortgages to be exempt
from credit risk retention because they would not require the same
243. See Statement From NAR President Gary Thomas on Qualified Residential
Mortgage Rule, NAT'L Ass'N OF REALTORS (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.realtor.org/news-

releases/2013/08/statement-from-nar-president-gary-thomas-on-qualified-residentialmortgage-rule.
244. See Moshe Pollock, How Do Real Estate Agents Get Paid?, REALTOR.COM,
http://www.realtor.com/home-finance/homebuyer-information/how-do-real-estate-agentsget-paid.aspx?source-web (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
245. See Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,118 (proposed Apr. 29, 2011)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
246. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,995.
247. See Margaret Chadbourn & Emily Stephenson, U.S. proposes relaxed 'skin in the
game'
mortgage
rules,
REUTERS
(Aug.
28,
2013,
1:22
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/28/us-usa-housing-regulationsidUSBRE97RO5L20130828.
248. See 156 CONG. REc. S10442 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson) (stating that lower down payments can be countered with mortgage insurance).
249. Id.
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amount of skin in the game. 250 However, QRM meaning QM has
sacrificed credit quality for exemption inclusivity. The re-proposed
QRM definition does not provide for any down payment requirement or
mortgage insurance which the drafters of QRM deemed extremely
important. 25 1 The original QRM definition might be too narrow, but
QRM meaning QM is too broad and goes against Congress's intended
goal. The Agencies started at one extreme and have now reached the
other, both of which are contradictory to Congress's intended goal.25 2
Despite Congress's intention, many would argue that QRM
should mean QM. 253 Many groups, including individuals, industry
participants, insurance companies, public interest groups, state agencies,
financial institutions, and trade organizations believe that "the original
QRM definition was too narrow and would increase borrowing costs
[and] reduce access to credit for borrowers who have higher levels of
monthly debt or cannot come up with a 20% down payment." 254 Not
surprisingly, these are the same groups who made identical arguments
against the final QM definition. 255 Any set of fixed underwriting rules
will exclude some creditworthy borrowers whether QRM is narrow,
QRM means QM, or some medium is reached.2 56 Their argument is
also belied by experience in Canada where most lenders insist on a
down payment of at least 20% of the home's value, although the
government provides some support to first-time and lower-income
home buyers, and lenders look carefully at the borrower's ability to

250. See id.
251. See id.
252. Compare Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,991 (proposed Sept. 20,
2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43) (showing the new requirements under QRM means
QM, excluding down payments and not instating any mortgage insurance requirement), with
Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,090, 24,123 (proposed Apr. 29,2011) (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43) (demonstrating the original QRM definition included a 20% down
payment requirement).
253. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,988-89 (stating that an overwhelming
majority of commenters disliked the original proposed QRM definition).
254. Ferullo, supra note 222 (discussing QRM= QM and providing opinions of those
who support QRM=QM).
255. See 155 CONG. REc. H5317 (daily ed. May 7, 2009) (statement of Rep. Pete
Sessions) (relaying a message from the Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA) stating that
"the bill's definition of 'qualified mortgage' is far too limited and will result in the
unavailability of sound credit options to many borrowers and the denial of credit to far too
many others").
256. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,118.
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make monthly payments.257 Despite the higher credit standards, the
homeownership rate is higher in Canada than in the United States.25 8
Regardless of any down payment requirement, the Agencies' QRM
definition should adopt a provision requiring mortgage insurance for
those individuals who cannot make reasonable down payments in order
to comply with Congress's intentions.2 59
Critics also claimed that the narrow QRM standard "would
become a new government-approved standard and lenders would be
reluctant to originate mortgages that did not meet that standard." 260
However, the Agencies' original QRM standard was meant to combat
those fears by excluding only a small number of loans, leaving a larger
non-QRM mortgage market requiring risk retention.261 All else being
equal, a larger market of non-QRMs would allow ABS backed by
non-QRM residential mortgages to be routinely issued and purchased by
a wide variety of investors, resulting in the market for such securities
being relatively liquid.26 2 The Agencies believed "the broader the
definition of a QRM, the less liquid the market ordinarily would be for
residential mortgages falling outside the QRM definition." 263 QRM
meaning QM would over-broaden the market and create the exact
problem critics have identified while allowing securitizers to avoid
having skin in the game. 264 The drafters of QRM under the Dodd-Frank
Act intended for QRMs to be the "new gold standard" for residential
mortgages, allowing for a broad and liquid non-QRM market.265
Critics believe that a narrow QRM definition could cause a
reduction in credit availability, while most experts believe when QM
goes into effect there will be some retrenchment in credit availability. 266
257. Pozen, supra note 235.
258. Id.

259. See 156 CONG. REC. S 10442 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson).
260. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,933 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013) (to
be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
261. Credit Risk Retention, 76 Fed. Reg. at 24,118.
262. Id.
263.

Id.

264. See generally Pozen, supra note 235 (claiming that QRM meaning QM is a good
way to cause another mortgage crisis).
265. 156 CONG. REc. S10441 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2012) (statement of Sen. Johnny
Isakson).
266. Rachel Witkowski, 'Safe Harbor'for QM Loans May Not Protect Banks, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 5, 2013, http://www.americanbanker.com/issues/178_172/safe-harbor-for-
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Initially, either definition will likely lead to some restriction of credit.
Congress intended QRMs to be mortgages that have a very low risk of
default in stressful economic environments that combine high
unemployment with sharp drops in home prices.26 7 Academic research
and the Agencies' own analyses indicate that taking into consideration
credit history and LTV ratios (down payments) or the use of mortgage
insurance to cover low down payments are significant factors in
determining the probability of mortgage default. 268 These factors are
what Congress intended to be included in a QRM even if some
borrowers may be adversely affected.26 9 Congress intended to prevent a
repeat of the financial crisis, and that means that securitizers must have
some skin in the game. 270 Therefore, QRM should not mean QM and
the Agencies should adopt a narrower definition of QRM.
VI. CONCLUSION

After the 2008 financial crisis, Congress set out to adopt
legislation that would provide borrowers with mortgages they could
reasonably afford and protect investors from being sold toxic MBS. 271
Congress created the CFPB and the ability-to-repay rule (defining QM)
to protect consumers from unaffordable credit.272 Congress instructed
the Agencies to define QRM as a credit risk retention rule to meet
27
When Congress
Congress's stated goal of protecting investors.27
instructed the Agencies to define QRM, it did not intend for QRM to
mean QM or for QRM to have a 30% down payment requirement,
qm-loans-may-not-protect-banks-1061822-1.html.
267. Pinto, supra note 176.
268. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,990 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
269. 156 CONG. REc. S3590-91 (daily ed. May 12, 2010) (statement of Sen. Mike
Crapo).
270. See Mortgage Lending Reform: A Comprehensive Review of the American
Mortgage System: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit, 111th
Cong. 173 (2009) (testimony of Julia Gordon, Center for Responsible Lending); Enhancing
Investor Protectionand the Regulation of Securities Markets: HearingBefore the Comm. on
Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Christopher J.
Dodd, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs).
271. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(Dodd-Frank), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (creating the ability-to-repay and
credit risk retention rules).
272. Ferullo, supra note 222.
273. Id.
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which the Agencies mandated in their alternative QRM definition,
QM-plus.27 4
Rather, Congress was trying to protect two distinct groupsborrowers and investors-whose interests do not always overlap. The
credit risk retention rule was moved out of TILA and into the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, showing Congress's intent to protect
investors.2 75 Congress created QRM to ensure securitizers had skin in
the game when they sold MBS to the investing public.27 6 Defining
QRM to mean QM allows securitizers to package mortgages that are not
very low risk without having to retain any of the credit risk.277 If
Congress intended for QRM to mean QM, it could have easily
stipulated that the Agencies define QRM according to the CFPB's final
QM definition or kept QM for both TILA and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Congress did not so intend, however, because it wanted
risk retention to be the rule and not the exception. 278 Consequently,
QRM should not mean QM and the Agencies should adopt a narrower
definition of QRM.
JEFFREY R. FAVITTA

274. See Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. 57,928, 57,994 (proposed Sept. 20, 2013)
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43).
275. See Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, H.R. 1728, 111th Cong. §
213 (2009) (original risk retention set up under TILA); Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), § 941 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(risk retention now under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
276. S. REP. No. 111-176, at 129 (2010).
277. See generally Pinto, supra note 176 (discussing why QRM should not mean QM).
278. Credit Risk Retention, 78 Fed. Reg. at 57,995.
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APPENDIX

Key Differences Between Original QRM Proposal And Final
QM Definition
Eligibility
Criteria

QM

Original QRM
Proposal

Eligible Loans

* First-lien mortgages

only
*Requires at least one
unit to be the
principal dwelling of
the borrower

____

__
___

Borrower Credit
History

Loan-to-Value
Ratio (LTV)

___
____

___

___

___

___

Sets derogatory
factors that must not
be met by the
borrower
* 80% or less for
purchase mortgage
transactions
or less for rate
and term refinancing
*0% or less for cashndout
refinancing

Down Payment
Requirement

* 20% on the purchase

Qualifying
Appraisal

* Supported by a

of any one-to-four
family property

written appraisal that
conforms to
generally accepted

9 Allows first liens
and subordinate
liens to qualify
oIncludes any closedend loan secured by
any dwelling (e.g.,
home purchase,
refinances, home
equity lines, and
second or vacation
homes)

l

h75%
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Ability to Repay

Assumability

appraisal standards,
as evidenced by the
Uniform Standards
of Professional
Appraisal Practice,
the appraisal
requirements of the
Federal banking
agencies, and
applicable laws.
* Front-end debt-toincome ratio cannot
exceed 28%
*Back-end debt-toincome ratio cannot
exceed 36%
* Not assumable by
any person who was
not a borrower under
the original

[Vol. 18

* Debt-to-income

ratio cannot exceed
43% (does not
break out debt-toincome ratios into
front or back end)

mortgage transaction

Government
Sponsored
Enterprises
(GSE) Inclusion

* QM if eligible for

purchase, guarantee
or insurance by a
GSE, HUD, the
Veterans
Administration,
U.S. Department of
Agriculture, or
Rural Housing
Service

